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I. INTRODUCTION
This conference is in the nature of a homecoming for me. Some twenty
years ago, my first law review article was published by the Georgia Journal
ofInternational and Comparative Law.' As the academics in the audience will
know, your first law review article is a little like your first girlfriend or
boyfriend-it is something you never forget. I am therefore especially grateful
for the opportunity that Professor Peter "Bo" Rutledge and his colleagues have
given me to return home and attend this conference. It is also a distinct honor
to be asked to deliver the conference's keynote address, particularly following
so many stimulating comments by the other speakers and participants in the
audience.
In this address, I would like to take a step back and discuss international
arbitration with a higher degree of abstraction than that of earlier speakers. I
would like to look not at the details of the New York Convention and the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), but instead at why arbitration has flourished
(especially internationally), what private and public objectives and values
arbitration serves, and what those values suggest about some of the pending
efforts to revise the existing treaty and legislative frameworks for international
arbitration.
II. THE CONTINUED POPULARITY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
I would like to begin with the observation that we have already heard-but
that is important to underscore-that international arbitration has become
increasingly popular in recent decades. You have heard some statistics, e.g., the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) reporting 700 new international cases
filed last year for the first time.2 Other leading arbitral institutions-including the
International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC),3 the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA),4 the International
' See Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J.
INT'L&COMP. L. 1 (1987).
2 See American Arbitration Association, AAA's 2008 Caseload Up 8 Percent
(Apr. 20,2009), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id'35937 (reporting that 703 cases were filed with
the International Centre for Dispute Resolution, the AAA's international division, in 2008).
1 2008 Statistical Report, 20 ICC CT. BULL. 5 (2009); 2006 Statistical Report, 18 ICC CT.
BULL. 5 (2007).
4 See ADRIAN WINSTANLEY, DIRECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT ON CASEWORK (Nov. 2008),
http://www.lcia.org/NEWSfolder/newsarchive7.htm (reporting an increase in disputes filed
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Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),5 and various regional
centers-have also reported similar increases in caseloads in recent years. If we
look back over the past two decades or so, this has not been a temporary or
short-lived phenomenon; rather, there has been a sustained and dramatic increase
in the number of international arbitrations that have been conducted over a
substantial number of years.6
It is difficult to estimate exactly how many international arbitrations are
conducted annually or precisely how substantial an increase has occurred over
the past decades. A starting point is provided by the annual statistics for the
main arbitral institutions in the United States and Europe-the ICC, the AAA,
and the LCIA. These statistics indicate a robust and growing body of
international arbitrations. In 1993, these institutions reported roughly 1,300
arbitrations. In 2007, the number was 3,200. 7 This is a remarkable increase
in percentage terms-and those figures do not capture the very significant
increase in arbitrations at national and regional centers around the world-such
as the Singapore International Arbitration Centre, the Vienna International
with the LCIA from 2006-2008).
5 INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, ICSID ANNUAL
REPORT 2008, at 3, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType'
ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal'ViewAnnualReports&year'2008_Eng.
6 See generally TOwARDs A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH, app. 1, at 341 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark
eds., 2005) [hereinafter TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION] (compiling
research on the number of cases filed from 1993-2003 with various arbitration tribunals); see
also Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Statistics, http://www.scci
nstitute.com/?id'23700 (last visited Nov. 17, 2009) [hereinafter SCC Sfatistics]; Hong Kong
International Arbitration Centre, About the HKIAC: Statistics, http://www.hkiac.org/showco
ntent.php?articleid'9 (last visited Nov. 17, 2009) [hereinafter HKIAC Statistics] (listing case
statistics for HKIAC and other arbitration tribunals, such as the China International Economic
and Trade Arbitration Commission).
7 Illustrated in the following statistics are the number of cases filed with each of the listed
arbitral institutions between 1993-2007: TOwARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONALARBITRATION,
supra note 6, app. 1, at 341 (providing data on cases filed with international arbitration
institutions from 1993-2003); TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra,
app. 2, at 344 (proving data on ICC arbitrations from 1921-2003); 2 J. GILLIS WETTER, THE
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 123-24 (1979) (reporting statistics
on cases filed with the American Arbitration Association from 1975-1977); SCC Statistics,
supra note 6; HKIAC Statistics, supra note 6.
8 See Singapore International Arbitration Centre, Facts and Figures: Statistics, http://www.
siac.org.sg/facts-statistics.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2009) (reporting case administration
increases at SIAC from 2000-2008).
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Arbitration Centre,9 and many others-which play an increasingly important
role in international dispute resolution.
These figures also do not take into account the dramatic increase in ad hoc
arbitrations in specialized commercial sectors, such as insurance and
reinsurance, construction, maritime disputes, or commodities, which use either
specialized arbitral institutions or ad hoc arbitration. Nor do these figures take
into account ICSID and bilateral investment treaty disputes, which have
increasingly been the subject of arbitration in the past decade. ICSID's
caseload a decade and a half ago was essentially moribund, but it currently
administers between 50 and 100 cases a year. 0
Ill. REASONS FOR THE POPULARITY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
Why is it that parties choose to arbitrate their international disputes? There
are a few tried and true explanations for this phenomenon.
Most of you have heard the comment that arbitration is quicker and cheaper
than litigation." Many of you have also heard the retort that arbitration is
9 For a listing of statistics on the International Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Federal
Economic Chamber, see HKIAC Statistics, supra note 6. For general information about the
Centre, see International Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber,
www.wko.at/arbitration (last visited Nov. 18, 2009). For further commentary, see FRANZ T.
SCHWARZ & CHRISTIAN W. KONRAD, THE VIENNA RuLEs: A COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION IN AuSTRIA (2009).
"S Stanimir A. Alexander, 20 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN INV. L.J. 648 (2005) (reviewing
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: KEY IssuEs (Karl P. Sauvent & J6rg Weber
eds., 2001)) ("The first year in which more than five ICSID cases were registered was 1997.
At the end of 1997, the number of pending cases was 14; at the end of 2001, it was 37; and at
the end of 2003, there were 64 pending cases. As of August 2005, ICSID's website listed
some 95 pending cases between investors and host states-well over half of which have been filed
in since 2003."). As ofNovember 2009, there were 121 pending cases. ICSID, List of Pending
Cases http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType'GenCaseDtIsRH&actionVa
l'ListPending (last visited Nov. 18, 2009).
" See 1 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIALARBITRATION 84-86 (2009); Thomas
J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 438-40 (1988) (discussing
the "speed and efficiency" of the arbitral process); U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE L.,
EXPLANATORY NOTE BY THE UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1985: WITH AMENDMENTS AS ADOPTED IN 2006,
at 27, U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2008) (noting that the "the parties to an arbitration agreement
make a conscious decision to exclude court jurisdiction and prefer the finality and expediency
of the arbitral process"); Nat'l Conf. of Commissioners on Unif. State Laws, Proposed Revisions
of the Uniform Arbitration Act (Draft), prefatory note, at 2 (1999), available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uarba/arbam99.pdf ("[T]he underlying reason many parties choose
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actually slower and more expensive than most alternatives.1 2  In truth, for
those who have had experience with different forms of international dispute
resolution, international arbitration is-as a general matter-often quicker and
less expensive than litigation.13 When account is taken of the delays resulting
from court backlogs (in many jurisdictions), appellate proceedings, discovery,
and other procedural aspects of national court litigation, international
arbitration typically produces a final resolution of disputes more quickly and
efficiently than litigation. That advantage is even more pronounced when the
possibilities of jurisdictional disputes, parallel proceedings, and obstacles to
recognition of foreign judgments are taken into account.
There are obviously examples of cases where international arbitration is
slower and more expensive than litigation of particular disputes. These
instances do not, however, alter the general experiences with arbitration of
international disputes. Cases involving lengthy arbitral proceedings not
infrequently reflect the fact that in some disputes the parties desire a full, and
necessarily time-consuming, opportunity to present their cases to the arbitral
tribunal; that is most obvious in complex international commercial disputes
with numerous disputed factual and legal issues, where there are good reasons
to devote a substantial amount of time to the merits of the parties' disputes, in
order to permit informed and just decision-making. In these sorts of cases, the
procedural flexibility of international arbitration permits parties and arbitrators
to proceed in a more deliberate and searching manner than in less complex
cases. That process takes time, but it is time that the parties want to be
devoted to the resolution of their dispute-rather than delays produced by court
backlogs or parallel proceedings.
International arbitration is also attractive because it provides a mechanism
for centralizing dispute resolution in a single forum. A peculiar risk of
international disputes is that of parallel proceedings in different national
arbitration is the relative speed, lower cost, and greater efficiency of the process ....").
2 Blue Tee Corp. v. Koehring Co., 999 F.2d 633, 634 (2d Cir. 1993) ("This appeal ...
makes one wonder about the alleged speed and economy of arbitration in resolving commercial
disputes."); Robert Layton, Arbitration in International Commercial Agreements: The Noose
Draws Tighter, 9 INT'L LAW. 741, 745 (1975); James Lyons, Arbitration: The Slower, More
Expensive Alternative?, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 107; Linda Silberman, International
Arbitration: Comments from a Critic, 13 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 9 (2002).
13 Christian Biihring-UhleA Survey onArbitration and Settlement in InternationalBusiness
Disputes: Advantages ofArbitration, in ToWARDsASCIENCEOFINTERNATIONALARBITRATION,
supra note 6, at 25, 32, 35; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private
Good, 8 J. LEGAL STuD. 235, 238 (1979); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An
Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (1995).
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courts, with one party's claims being heard in one place and the other party's
claims being heard in a different place."4 International arbitration allows all
the parties' disputes to be put in a single centralized forum where a single,
uniform decision can resolve these disputes. That is of particular interest to
commercial parties." At the same time, arbitration typically will not permit
the joinder or intervention of non-parties, which may well not permit
resolution of all related disputes in a single forum-a result which is at least
theoretically possible in some national court proceedings. 6
Another reason for the popularity of international arbitrations is the pro-
arbitration legal framework that developed states and, increasingly, other states
have adopted.17 As a consequence, international arbitration enjoys an
"enforceability premium," at both the agreement stage and the decision stage,
compared to the mechanism available in most judicial proceedings.
We are here in part to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the New York
Convention-which has now been adopted by some 140 states around the
world. That celebration is appropriate, because the Convention provides an
extraordinarily effective and robust legal framework for giving effect to
international arbitration agreements and international arbitral awards. 18 In
particular, Article II of the Convention commands Contracting States to
recognize international arbitration agreements, subject only to enumerated
14 GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIvIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 1-4, passim (4th ed. 2007); ALBERT V. DICEY, JOHN H. MORRIS & LAWRENCE
COLLINS, DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS on THE CONFLICT OF LAWS passim (14th ed. 2006).
Is 1 BORN, supra note 11, at 84-86.
16 Jurisdictional and other obstacles may well also preclude centralized resolution of such
disputes in national courts. In principle, however, the mandatory joinder and intervention
possibilities in national courts will be superior to those available in most arbitrations.
"7 1 BORN, supra note 11, at 201.
18 ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958:
TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 1 (1981); see also Richard J. Graving, Status
of the New YorkArbitration Convention: Some Gaps in Coverage but New Acceptances Confirm
its Vitality, 10 ICSID REv.: FOREIGN INv. L.J. 1, 3 (1995) (describing the New York Convention
as the "mortar in the edifice of international commercial arbitration"); Michael J. Mustill,
Arbitration: History and Background, J. INT'L ARB., June 1989, at 43, 49 (describing the New
York Convention as arguably the "most effective instance of international legislation in the entire
history of commercial law"); Steven Schwebel, A Celebration of the United Nations New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 12 ARB.
INT'L 83, 85 (1996); J. Gillis Wetter, The Present Status of the International Court of
Arbitration of the ICC: An Appraisal, 1 AM. REv. INT'LARB. 91, 93 (1990) (describing the New
York Convention as the "single most important pillar on which the edifice of international
arbitration rests").
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defenses, while Articles Ill and V of the Convention obligate Contracting
States to recognize international arbitral awards, again subject only to
enumerated defenses.
At the same time, legislation has been enacted in national jurisdictions
around the world which gives expansive effect to the New York Convention.
Chapter 2 of the FAA, in this country, is a leading example of such legislation.
Elsewhere, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration has
increasingly been adopted to underpin the New York Convention and to give
effect to its two central commands: that Contracting States recognize and
enforce international arbitration agreements and arbitral awards.'9
It is fair to say that legislation now exists in all developed states which
faithfully and effectively implements the New York Convention, and that this
legislation is, for the most part, given expansive effect by courts in those states.
In addition, and importantly, the last twenty years have seen an increasing
number of developing and other states, which historically had not embraced
either international or domestic arbitration, adopting either the UNCITRAL
Model Law or other arbitration instruments, as well as acceding to the New
York Convention, the ICSID Convention, and other international instruments.2 °
At the same time, courts in these states have begun to adopt notably pro-
enforcement approaches to issues arising under the Convention-in some
instances, approaches that are more supportive of the arbitral process than
those in many early adherents to the Convention. 21 Although by no means
perfect, particularly in more recent adherents to the New York Convention, it
'9 1 BORN, supra note 11, at 115-21.
2 Id. at 147. For example, some fifty jurisdictions have adopted legislation based on the
UNCITRAL Model Law as of mid-2008. For an updated list ofjurisdictions, see http://www.un
citral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/2002Mode -conciliation-status.htm. At time of
publication, UNCITRAL cited the following jurisdictions as having adopted legislation based
on the Model Law: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus,
Bermuda, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China (Hong Kong and Macau Special
Administrative Regions), Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Germany, Greece,
Guatemala, Hungary, India, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Lithuania, Madagascar,
Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Russia, Scotland, Serbia, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia,
Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe, as well as the U.S. states of
California, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Oregon, and Texas.
2 See, e.g., Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd, reprinted in 31 Y.B. Com.
Arb. 747 (2006); Sumito v. Antig Inv. Pte Ltd, [2009] SGCA 41 (Sing. Ct. of Appeal).
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is fair to say that the implementation of Articles II, III, and V of the
Convention by courts in Contracting States tends to be good.
In contrast to experience under the Convention, the enforcement of forum
selection clauses and national court judgments tends to be materially more
problematic in many jurisdictions. In many instances, the enforcement of
international forum selection clauses and/or foreign judgments is governed
entirely by domestic law, which often reflects parochial protections for local
nationals; at the same time, the absence of recognized international standards
increases the risk of favoritism towards local parties, which is mitigated in
matters arising under the Convention's international standards. In sum, the
comparative robustness and efficacy of the international legal framework for
international arbitration, in contrast to available alternatives, has been an
important reason for the popularity of arbitration as a means for resolving
international disputes.22
There is no guarantee that international arbitration will always retain this
relative advantage over other forms of dispute resolution. The Hague
Conference on Private International Law's draft Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements would provide improved international standards for the
enforcement of international forum selection agreements-if it were ratified by
significant numbers of states. Even then, however, the Convention's
limitations and exceptions would leave the enforceability of forum selection
clauses subject to significant uncertainties and afford international arbitration
agreements and arbitral awards a substantial "enforceability premium," as
compared with international forum selection agreements. 3
International arbitration also provides a means of dispute resolution that can
be-and often is-neutral as between the parties. When U.S. and Japanese, or
Russian and German, parties conclude a commercial contract, neither is
particularly receptive to the prospect of litigation in its counter-party's home
courts. Those concerns are often rooted in sound concerns about the neutrality
of local courts in international disputes. International arbitration provides
parties with the option of resolving their dispute in a neutral geographical
22 The evidence is in part anecdotal. See, e.g., Bihring-Uhle, supra note 13, at 25, 31, 35
(one of the "two most significant advantages and presumably the two most important reasons for
choosing arbitration as a means of international commercial dispute resolution [is] ... the
superiority of its legal framework with treaties like the New York Convention guaranteeing the
international enforcement of awards"); PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 6-7 (2008) [hereinafter PWC REPORT],
available at http://www.pwc.co.uk/pdf/PwCIntemationalArbitration_2008.pdf.
23 1 BORN, supra note 11, at 76-78; BORN& RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 442, 459, 1017.
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location (i.e., a state other than that where either of the parties is based) before
a tribunal chaired by someone who does not share either party's nationality.
This removes a principal basis for concerns about bias in international dispute
resolution; it also provides an advantage that is less easily replicated by forum
selection clauses, where selection of courts unrelated to either party often raise
issues of language, suitability of procedural rules, and the like.
These reasons-relative efficiency and cost, centralization of dispute
resolution, enforceability, neutrality, and expertise-go a considerable distance
in explaining the popularity of international arbitration. But these are not the
only reasons that lead parties to choose to arbitrate, nor the only reasons that
nations, in particular free and democratic societies, have given effect to
international and domestic arbitration agreements. Indeed, these are not
necessarily the most important reasons for the historic popularity of arbitration
as a mode of dispute resolution.
IV. ARBITRATION AS AN ASPECT OF PARTY AUTONOMY AND
ASSOCIATIONAL FREEDOM
At its most basic level, arbitration is an expression of party autonomy.
When parties agree to arbitrate their disputes, they select a particular
mechanism for dispute resolution-a contractual and consensual mechanism
that grants very broad freedom to the parties to define the manner of dispute
resolution and to minimize the role of third parties (including the state) in that
dispute resolution process. This aspect of arbitration-the parties' dominant
role in defining their own dispute resolution process-is essential to
understanding why parties arbitrate and why nations have adopted pro-
arbitration international instruments and legislation which encourages the use
of arbitration to resolve disputes.
The means by which parties resolve disputes is a fundamentally important
aspect of their underlying contractual (or other) relationship; it is no less
important than the parties' decision to enter into a contractual relationship or
the manner in which parties structure and conduct that relationship. The
parties' relationship-whether pursuant to a contract or other kind of
relationship-is designed to endure through good times and bad times. It needs
to endure, not just in the warm afterglow of signing the contract and of closing
the deal, but also after problems and disputes inevitably arise. Ifthose disputes
cannot be resolved in a way that is consistent with the parties' underlying
relationship, then that relationship will itself be compromised.
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It is elementary that arbitration permits parties to agree upon virtually all
aspects of dispute resolution.24 Under the New York Convention, and most
developed national legal systems, parties are free to agree upon the arbitral
procedures (as also noted above), upon the arbitral seat, upon the identities of
the arbitrators, upon the confidentiality of the proceedings, and upon a vast
range of other aspects of the dispute resolution process.25
If the parties desire a fast-track arbitration, one that is over and done within
three months, they can agree to that.2 6 If the parties desire a documents-only
arbitration, because they do not want to incur significant expense in having
their dispute resolved, they can agree to that.27 If the parties want a
construction arbitration with a highly specialized mechanism before a
specialized tribunal, they can agree to that.28 This flexibility is in contrast to
national court procedures where parties typically are in a court of general
jurisdiction, and the idea that the parties can pick the particular judge (or
prescribe the qualifications of the judge) who will resolve their dispute is
anathema.29
This wide scope for party autonomy leaves it to the parties to define the
character of "their" dispute resolution mechanisms. In particular, it allows
parties to select means of dispute resolution that exclude otherwise responsible
governmental institutions and applicable judicial procedures and instead adopt
mechanisms aimed at preserving the parties' underlying commercial
relationship.
24 Alan Scott Rau, The Culture ofAmerican Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 449, 534 (2005) ("[P]arties can experiment with dispute resolution - cutting and
tailoring, shaping and adapting different processes to meet their own particular needs .... ");
Stipanowich, supra note 11, at 433-35 (discussing the advantages of arbitration including
flexibility and informality).
25 1 BORN, supra note 11, at 92-101.
26 Special Section: Fast-TrackArbitration, 2 AM. REV. INT'LARB. 137 (1991); Hans Bagner,
ExpeditedArbitration Rules: Stockholm and WIPO, 13 ARB. INT'L 193 (1997); Dana H. Freyer,
Getting 'Fast-Track' Arbitration: Pre-Dispute Agreements and Post-Dispute Techniques, in
LIBER AMICORUM MICHEL GAUDET 104 (1999); Michael Mustill, Comments on Fast-Track
Arbitration, J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 1993, at 121.
27 ROBERTM. MERKIN, ARBITRATION LAW, at 15.3 (Louis Flannery ed., 2004 & Update 2007);
ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HuNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, at 6-104 (4th ed. 2004).
28 Paul Hobeck, Volker Mahnken & Max Koebke, Time for WoolfReforms in International
Construction Arbitration, 2008 INT'L ARB. L. REv. 84.
29 Bfihring-Uhle, supra note 13, at 25, 33; Toby Landau, Composition and Establishment
of the Tribunal (Articles 14 to 36), 9 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 45 (1998); PWC REPORT, supra
note 22, at 5.
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It is no coincidence that arbitration traces many of its roots to trade
associations, commercial guilds, and religious associations. In each of these
settings, the members of a community chose to have disputes with other people
in that community resolved by a mechanism of their own choice and design.
Parties in these contexts did so because they desired to minimize the effects of
their disputes on their underlying and shared community. At a fundamental
level, parties agreed to arbitrate in these contexts because they wanted
maximum autonomy and control over the resolution of their disputes and, in
particular, wanted to ensure that the resolution of these disputes did not disrupt
or damage their underlying relationship, out of which their disputes arose.
The same objectives are present-albeit less starkly-in more typical
commercial contractual settings. Parties to contracts in particular commercial
industries (e.g., insurance and reinsurance, oil and gas, commodities, financial
services, transport, maritime) very frequently agree to arbitrate pursuant to
mechanisms that are developed by and for those industries." Equally, parties
in other types of commercial arrangements (e.g., joint ventures, project
finance) take care to draft and tailor their dispute resolution mechanism
specifically to suit their particular relationship. Importantly, in making all of
these decisions to utilize arbitration as a means of dispute resolution, parties
act to define and structure not just their dispute resolution mechanism, but also
their underlying relationship itself; they act to safeguard their shared
association with one another against the disputes which will inevitably arise
and against the process of dispute resolution. Parties choose arbitration not
just because of its characteristics as a dispute resolution mechanism, but
because of their ability jointly to determine how the process of dispute
resolution will affect their underlying relationship with one another.
Developed states have long given binding legal effect to these expressions
of party autonomy and associational freedom through agreements to
arbitrate-in substantial part precisely because arbitration agreements are
expressions of party autonomy and associational freedom. Indeed, when one
considers the jurisdictions that have been most hostile over the years to
arbitration, they have been the jurisdictions that have been most hostile
towards other types of freedoms and, in particular, the freedom of private
parties to associate with one another.
The treatment of arbitration in France provides an excellent illustration of
this point. In the immediate aftermath of the French Revolution, one of the
principal articles of the Constitution of Year One guaranteed the right to
3 1 BORN, supra note 11, at 78-8 1.
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arbitrate.3 The first act of the French National Assembly after the Revolution
was to include a guarantee that the right of the citizens to have their disputes
settled by arbitrators of their choice would not be violated in any way. This
might be regarded as a fairly unusual initial step for a constitutional document
(addressing what is arguably a fine point of civil procedure). But when one
considers arbitration as an expression of party autonomy and associational
freedom, this was not a surprising step at all. Rather, it was seen to be, and
was, an important step in securing liberty, equality, and fraternity which was
rightly one of the initial guarantees adopted by the French Constitution.
Unfortunately, the French experience is important notjust for this point, but
also because of what happened next. Like many other aspects of the French
Revolution, the revolutionaries soon turned on their initial decision regarding
arbitration.32 Only a few years later, in 1806, the Napoleonic Code adopted
an absolutist conception of state judicial authority, which largely rejected the
use of arbitration, invalidating agreements to arbitrate future disputes in
virtually all contexts, except a very narrow range of commercial partnership
disputes.33 That action was motivated by the stated view that arbitrators
provided a brand of justice that was inferior to that of French courts and that,
even if parties wished to arbitrate, they were nonetheless required to have their
disputes resolved by national judges, in national courts, and according to
national procedures.34
It took another eighty years for this aspect of French law to be changed. In
part because of the Geneva Protocol and Geneva Convention, France reformed
its arbitration statutes, both domestically and internationally in the 1920s.
Those revisions again gave effect to the associational liberties that had been
31 FRENCH CONSTITUTION OF THE YEAR I, art. 86 (ratified June 24, 1793) ("The right of the
citizens to have their disputes settled by arbitrators of their choice shall not be violated in any
way whatsoever.").
32 RENE DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 90 (1985). This perception
apparently arose from the use of compulsory arbitration in a wide range of civil disputes
(including domestic relations, inheritance, and similar areas). J.-J. Clare, L'Arbitrage
Rivolutionnaire: Apogee et Dclin d'une Institution (1790-1806), 1981 REV. ARB. 3, 21-23.
33 Articles 1003 to 1028 of the 1806 Code of Civil Procedure introduced an extremely
unfavorable legal regime for arbitration. See MATrHIEU DE BOIss SON, LE DROIT FRANIAIS DE
L'ARBITRAGE INTERNE ET INTERNATIONAL 1118-11 (2d ed. 1990); Clre, supra note 32, at 3;
DAVID, supra note 32, at 90.
" One commentator observes: " '[A]II the provisions of the [Napoleonic Code] do appear
to reflect, so to speak, a hatred of arbitration agreements and provide evidence of a secret desire
to eliminate their existence.' " DAVID, supra note 32, at 90 (quoting Bellot); see also 1 BORN,
supra note 11, at 38-39.
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guaranteed in the Constitution of Year One, but subsequently abandoned.
More recently, France ratified the New York Convention and adopted
legislation (supported by expansive judicial interpretations) which is arguably
among the most pro-enforcement in the world.35
A second historical example is Germany. Through the Middle Ages, the
trade guilds in German-speaking Europe had been important commercial
institutions, with arbitration playing a substantial role in the functioning of
those institutions. Later, during the 19th century, the local civil procedure
codes of German states (e.g., Bavaria and Prussia) guaranteed the right to
arbitrate and generally gave effect to arbitration agreements.36 Indeed, German
courts rendered decisions a century ago on issues such as the separability
doctrine that read remarkably like the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision
in Buckeye.37
That approach to arbitration changed in the 1930s, when the National
Socialists came to power in Germany. Along with taking control of all aspects
of life, the National Socialists curtailed the use of arbitration in both domestic
and international matters.3" Much like the Napoleonic Code, the rationale for
this action was the view that centralized state control over all aspects of life,
including dispute resolution, was essential. In 1933, it was observed in the
Guidelines of the Reich Regarding Arbitral Tribunals that "from a state-
political point of view a further spread of arbitration would shatter confidence
in state jurisdiction and the State itself. ' 39 One contemporary commentator
approved the declaration, adding "that the national-socialist state
rejects-contrary to liberalists' views-arbitral tribunals" altogether.4" Again,
it was totalitarian ideology, jealous of private autonomy and associational
freedoms that was hostile to arbitration and agreements to arbitrate-which was
seen as an explicit threat to government control.
Post-war Germany abandoned these views about the necessity for state
control of dispute resolution and re-embraced both international and domestic
arbitration. Post-war German legislation and court decisions gave broad effect
35 1 BORN, supra note 11, at 121-25.
36 ALFRED VON LINDHEIM, DAS SCHIEDSGERICHT IM MODERNEN CIvIPROcESSE 17 (1891).
3' Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447-48 (2006).
31 Walter Raeke, Dienst am Recht, 65 JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRiFT 3 (1935); E. Kuntze,
Schiedsgericht oder Rechtsprechung durch die Gerichte des Staates, 63 JuRISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRiFr 649 (1934); Karl Blomeyer, Betrachtungen fiber die Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit,
in FESTGABE ZUM SIEBZIGSTEN GEBURTSTAG VON LEO ROSENBERG 59 (1949).
39 Richtlinien des Reiches fiber Schiedsgerichte, 95 DEUTSCHE JUSTIz 52, 821 (1933).
40 Kuntze, supra note 38, at 653.
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to agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards.4 1 Likewise, Germany ratified
the New York Convention and, more recently, adopted the UNCITRAL Model
Law, returning to its historic traditions of giving vigorous effect to agreements
to arbitrate and recognizing arbitral awards.
There are contemporary examples of countries that do not embrace
arbitration. Those examples include recent decisions by several states to
withdraw from ICSID, or other international instruments providing for
international arbitration. They also include the difficulties that have been
encountered in enforcing international arbitration agreements and awards in
states that reject the notion of open market economies.
Although there are counter-examples, it is fair to conclude that free
societies have generally permitted and encouraged arbitration, while
totalitarian regimes have historically disfavored or prohibited arbitration. That
can be seen in historical developments in France and Germany, as well as in
contemporary experiences around the world today.
This observation returns us to one of the underlying reasons that arbitration
is chosen by parties and given effect and encouraged by states. As we have
seen, that is because arbitration is often an expression of party autonomy and
associational liberty, aimed at structuring and securing the parties' underlying
relationship or community. The choice of arbitration as a means to resolve
disputes entails private citizens choosing between themselves how they want
disputes about their underlying relationship to be resolved-precisely so that
their underlying relationship can be preserved. From this perspective,
arbitration is an expression of private parties' desires to control, to the
maximum extent possible, the nature and character of their underlying
relationship, to minimize the potentially deleterious impact of disputes on that
relationship, and to structure their own dispute resolution process in a manner
that strengthens and preserves their relationship.
It is therefore not surprising that this exercise of private autonomy and
associational freedom has been seen, from the Napoleonic Code to the Reich's
Guidelines for Arbitral Tribunals to the decisions of a few states to reject
arbitration as a means of international dispute resolution, as a threat to
totalitarian regimes. The parties' very endeavor to structure their underlying
relations with one another, and to define the manner of dispute resolution,
conflicts with the objective of totalitarian states to control all aspects of life.
Conversely, the control of the manner in which parties resolve their dispute,
not only enables the totalitarian state to control the dispute resolution process,
41 1 BORN, supra note 11, at 47-121.
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but permits the state to insert itself into and control the parties' underlying
relationship.
In contrast, free societies have characteristically not merely permitted, but
sought affirmatively to encourage and facilitate, the autonomy of private
parties to resolve their disputes by arbitration. That can best be seen in the
actions of developed states during the twentieth century (embracing the
Geneva Convention and Protocol and, later, the New York Convention) and by
the increasing willingness of other states to adopt these instruments as their
economic and political systems were liberalized during the last three decades
of the twentieth century. These states have permitted and encouraged
arbitration in part for precisely the same reasons that they have encouraged
other forms of voluntary associations and freedoms-namely, because of an
abiding commitment to these freedoms as essential aspects of a free and
democratic society.
V. FOUNDATIONAL DOCUMENTS OF ARBITRATION IN
COMPARISON TO CONSTITUTIONS
It is useful now to return briefly to the legal regime that is the subject of
this conference-the New York Convention-and to the FAA, which gives effect
to the Convention in the United States. In particular, given the central
importance of party autonomy and associational liberty to the arbitral process,
it is useful to consider the principal provisions of the New York Convention
and the FAA in constitutional terms, aimed at protecting associational
freedom, as well as at securing efficient and enforceable dispute resolution
mechanisms.
Both the New York Convention and the FAA are remarkably constitutional
in many respects. Both instruments are short, couched in broad, abstract
language.42 We can compare the terms of the Due Process Clause to the terms
of, for example, section 2 of the FAA, which provides only that arbitration
agreements will be given effect in the same way as other contracts. Articles
II and V of the New York Convention are similarly brief and broadly worded.
There are other structural similarities between the New York Convention,
the FAA, and many national constitutions. All of these instruments have been
legislatively approved by super-majorities. The New York Convention has
now been adopted by 144 countries around the world, and the FAA was
adopted unanimously by the U.S. Congress in 1925. Less clearly, the
42 Id. at 101.
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UNCITRAL Model Law appears headed towards attaining either universal
status (akin to that of the New York Convention) or at least towards playing
a dominant role in defining the contents of national arbitration legislation.43
Further, like national constitutions, the New York Convention and most
national arbitration statutes play comparable roles in mediating between
private autonomy (or liberty) and governmental regulatory interests. Most
fundamentally, Article II of the New York Convention and section 2 of the
FAA guarantee the parties' right to agree to resolve their disputes by
arbitration-thereby both safeguarding and encouraging the exercise of private
autonomy, in a manner akin to constitutional safeguards of private rights
against governmental intrusion. Other provisions of the Convention and the
FAA give similar effect to the parties' freedom to select arbitrators, arbitral
procedures, and similar matters. Given this, Article II and section 2 can
properly be understood as guarantees of party autonomy and associational
freedom-singling out arbitration agreements as forms of contracts entitled to
particular respect by national courts.
The fact that developed states give effect to private arbitration agreements
as an expression of associational liberty does not afford parties unlimited
freedom with respect to their arbitration agreement. The parties' freedom to
arbitrate does not mean that there is no role for state regulation of the subjects
of arbitration or the specification of arbitral procedures, any more than that
other forms of liberty are unlimited. Under both the New York Convention
and national arbitration legislation, there are limits to the validity of arbitration
agreements (paralleling those applicable to other forms of contracts)," to the
types of disputes which may be arbitrated (under the so-called "non-
arbitrability doctrine"),45 and to the parties' freedom to select arbitral
procedures.46
But, like national constitutions, which mediate between private
rights-whether it is the freedom to associate, freedom to speak, or freedom to
do something else-and governmental interests, the New York Convention and
the FAA provide a framework for striking the balance between associational
interests and regulatory interests. These instruments provide the general
" For example, England did not expressly adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law, but its
arbitration legislation (the Arbitration Act, 1996) was based closely on the Model Law.
44 1 BoRN, supra note 11, at 580-625.
41 Id. at 766-841.
46 Id. at 569.
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outlines and framework for determining when private parties may agree to
arbitrate particular subjects, what procedures they may adopt, and so forth.47
In another of the parallels between a constitution, on the one hand, and the
New York Convention and the FAA, on the other, it has been mostly by
common law development that those instruments have been articulated. This
can be seen, for example, in the judicial development of the non-arbitrability
doctrine in the United States and France.48 It can also be seen through the
general absence of specific legislative rules regarding mandatory arbitral
procedures, coupled with reliance on case-by-case development of judicial
standards governing the subject.49 In each instance, national courts have
articulated the boundaries between private autonomy and governmental
regulation of the arbitral process through common law decisions, looking to
the underlying purposes and objectives of arbitration-in much the same
fashion that other constitutional freedoms are developed.
VI. CONCLUSION
What does all this tell us about the questions we have been discussing at
this Conference-whether we should amend the New York Convention or
amend the FAA? If one considers the New York Convention and FAA as
instruments with a constitutional character, guaranteeing both the autonomy
of parties to arbitrate and important aspects of their associational liberty, one
ought to be hesitant to tinker with them. Most national constitutions are not
easily or readily amended, precisely because they safeguard long-standing and
important private freedoms which should not lightly be altered in the face of
shifting political climates. Equally, courts in most jurisdictions find ways,
through the development of case law, to address the lack of modem terms or
modifications in constitutional texts, and to deal with both changing times and
changing problems. In my view, these considerations argue powerfully for
restraint and moderation in adopting changes to instruments which express
fundamental freedoms, which have provided the basis for the development of
substantial and carefully-articulated bodies of judicial authority and which
have withstood the test of time.
If one is not going to legislatively revise the New York Convention or the
FAA, that does not mean that defects in the implementation of either
47 Id. at 571-609.
48 Id. at 766-85.
49 Id. at 82-103.
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instrument must be ignored. On the contrary, the courts, academia, and the
forthcoming ALI Restatement are both free and obliged to explain, articulate,
and reformulate the law as commercial circumstances and problems change.
There is ample room in the existing text of the Convention, and the FAA, to
adapt both to changing commercial and other circumstances, without undoing
the vital importance that both instruments play in contemporary international
commercial affairs and in the associational freedoms of private parties.
